American Indian Law Review
Volume 7

Number 1

1-1-1979

Administrative Law: Secretarial Powers; Civil Procedure: Forum
Determination and Statutory Interpretation Regarding Indian Land
Claims; Civil Rights: Sovereign Immunity Upheld in County Court;
Constitutional Law: Inverse Condemnation and Eminent Domain-Remedies; Hunting and Fishing Rights: Enforcement of Quotas;
Jurisdiction: Indian Country Concept Extended to Indian Schools;
Jurisdiction: Public Law 280 Authority and its Acquisition;
Jurisdiction: Regulation of Hunting and Fishing on Public Law 280
Follow
and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Land;thisSelf-Determination:
Regulation of Hunting and Fishing on
Part of the Indigenous,
Indian, and Aboriginal
Law Commons
Reservation;
Sovereignty:
Multiple
Jurisdiction and the Double
Jeopardy Question; Sovereignty: "Smoke Shop" Licensing;
Recommended Citation
Taxation:
Back-Door
Taxation
of Allotted
Land; Taxation:
Administrative Law:
Secretarial Powers;
Civil Procedure:
Forum Determination
and StatutoryNatural
Interpretation
Regarding Indian Land Claims; Civil Rights: Sovereign Immunity Upheld in County Court; Constitutional
Resources
on Tribal Land--Who may Tax Severance?; Taxation: Oil
Law: Inverse Condemnation and Eminent Domain--Remedies; Hunting and Fishing Rights: Enforcement of
Quotas; Jurisdiction: Indian Country Concept Extended to Indian Schools; Jurisdiction: Public Law 280
and
Gas Leases to Non-Indian Lessees; Taxation: Property Tax
Authority and its Acquisition; Jurisdiction: Regulation of Hunting and Fishing on Public Law 280 Land;
Self-Determination:
Regulation
of Hunting
Fishing on Reservation;
Sovereignty: Multiple
Jurisdiction
Exemption not
Extended
toand
Income;
Tribal Membership:
Who
and the Double Jeopardy Question; Sovereignty: "Smoke Shop" Licensing; Taxation: Back-Door Taxation of
Allotted
Land; Taxation:
Natural Resources
on Tribal
Land--Who may Tax Severance?; Taxation: Oil and
Determines
Eligibility
for Tribal
Benefits?
Gas Leases to Non-Indian Lessees; Taxation: Property Tax Exemption not Extended to Income; Tribal
Membership: Who Determines Eligibility for Tribal Benefits?, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 171 (1979),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss1/8

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Secretarial Powers
In the case of Johnson v. Kleppe, 596 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979),
the Secretary of the Interior made an heirship determination. Persons excluded by these findings sued, averring that the Secretary
had misinterpreted Oklahoma's kinship statute' and both misread
and misapplied the leading case precedent. 2 The Tenth Circuit
dismissed the attack under 25 U.S.C. § 372, which holds the
Secretary's determination in issues such as this to be final and
conclusive. The court also noted that protests under the aegis of
the Administrative Procedures Act were inapplicable because the
statute mentioned precludes review.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Forum Determination and Statutory
Interpretation Regarding Indian Land Claims
Land ownership was the question in Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, 99 S. Ct. 2529 (1979). Land had been given to the Omahas
by treaty. At the time of the treaty the land had been clearly
defined, but through time the Mississippi River had formed an
oxbow and finally cut through the peninsula so formed. As a
result the land became part of Iowa, where non-Indian owners
settled on it. The legal issue lay in whether the land had been
transferred through accretion or avulsion, but the procedural
question involved the placement of the burden of proof. 25
U.S.C. § 194 states that in trials regarding the rights of parties,
Indian versus white person, the burden of proof will always be
placed on the white person whenever the Indian shall make out a
presumption of title in himself from the fact of prior possession
or ownership. The district court applied Nebraska, rather than
federal, law to the case and placed the burden of proof upon the
party seeking to quiet title, in this case, the Omaha Tribe.
Through a failure in the burden of proof, the land was held to
have shifted through accretion, and it was consequently awarded
to the Iowa settlers.' The Eighth Circuit reversed, 2 charging that
federal law was controlling because the change of a state bound1. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 222 (1970).
2. In re Estate of Robbs v. Howard, 504 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1972).
1. 433 F. Supp. 67 (1977).
2. 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978).
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ary was a federal question, and the determination of Indian rights
was also a federal issue. Holding the district court in error for its
failure to apply 25 U.S.C. § 194, the circuit court found the
evidence to be in equipoise and therefore awarded the land to the
Omahas.
The Supreme Court upheld the original decision. Although it
rejected the notion that the federal statute applied only to individual Indians and not to tribes, it did, however, hold that
although an artificial entity could be a "white person" for the
purposes of the statute, a state can in no way be a person. The
Supreme Court conceded that federal law was applicable because
the extermination of Indian rights was at issue, but found that
resort to federal court in this case was not actually necessary
because through a compact between the states of Iowa and
Nebraska there had been no actual alteration of a state boundary.
Because the land question itself did not then involve a federal
question, state law would apply, and because by compact that
land belonged to Nebraska, Nebraska law was applicable. Since,
under Nebraska law, the burden of proof lay upon the Omahas
and they had not met it, the Supreme Court declared the land as
vested in the new non-Indian owners.
CIVIL RIGHTS: Sovereign Immunity Upheld in County Court
The Ganienkeh community was the site of the dispute in Altona
Citizens' Committee, Inc. v. Altona, CA No. 57 (N. Y., Albany
Cty., Sup. Ct., December 4, 1978). Ganienkeh consists of some
6,000 acres of land made available through a lease and permit
granted by the state to the Turtle Island Trust, which was created
to assist Ganienkeh. Suit was instituted to have removed certain
obstructions and barricades placed by the community upon alleged public highways and also to have both Ganienkeh and the
legal relationship between the state of New York and the Turtle
Island Trust declared unlawful. The sole defense was that of
sovereign immunity, with which the court agreed. The court ruled
that the complainants lacked the standing to sue for public
nuisance as well. As the court found the public highways in concern to be unpaved roads upon and ending in trust land, it said,
"The balance of equities favors the privacy and protection of
Ganienkeh and not the maintenance of unobstructed dirt roads
which lead to restricted trust-owned property." The court ruled
further that the lease by the state to the trust was not invalid
because it was in furtherance of a public purpose. The fee had
been alienated from the state; therefore, the plaintiffs could not
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sue under the Parks and Recreation Land Acquisition Bond Act.
The court then closed its case with: "The promotion and preservation of Native American heritage is a form of conservation of
one of our most valuable resources."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Inverse Condemnation and
Eminent Domain-Remedies
United States v. Clarke, 590 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1979), dealt with
the manner in which the state government may seize Indian property. A private party had built a road across Indian land and later
transferred it to the state. This process of inverse condemnation
was contested by the United States, advancing the contention that
the state may not acquire any interest in Indian lands except by
eminent domain under 25 U.S.C. § 357. The Ninth Circuit allowed inverse condemnation on the theory that the individual Indian should not be denied the chance to pursue a monetary
remedy. Should the state be allowed to reacquire the property
through eminent domain, the injured party would gain little, but
if suits for damages are allowed in these incidents, the Ninth Circuit speculated that the government may use more circumspection
in future proceedings of this kind. This case is pending review in
the Supreme Court.
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS:

Enforcement of Quotas

The tripartite decision in Puget Sound Gillnetters' Assoc. v.
United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Washington v. United States, and State v.
Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Assoc., 99 S.Ct.
3055 (1979), has upheld the regionally famous Boldt decision.
The incident giving rise thereto was a lower court decision
allocating 50 percent of the fish catch in certain rivers, streams,
and bays to the Indian tribes, and requiring the Washington State
Department of Fisheries to adopt regulations protecting the same.
The new regulations were challenged by various citizens' groups
in the Washington state courts,' which ordered noncompliance
with the district court's directives, citing no special rights for
Indians and the corollary of reverse discrimination as its reasons.
The Department of Fisheries complied with the order, while the
state Game Department had refused to follow the district court
all along. The district court then took the authority to supervise
1. 88 Wash. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the Washington
fisheries so as to protect. the rights it had
2
.
granted
Since the district court (or Boldt) decision had been based on
old treaty language, the main argument in the Supreme Court
centered upon whether the treaties concerned guaranteed a
specific share or only "access" to fish. The Supreme Court
looked for the intent of the parties, characterizing its search in
the words of Jones v. Meehan: "The treaty must therefore be
construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to
learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians," 3 and found the concept of mere access to be incompatible with the treaty. A class right, not an individual right, to fish was found to exist. In addition, the Court
found convincing precedent to support the notion of a quota in
United States v. Winans' and Puyallup Tribe v. Washington
Dep't of Game.' Therefore, a maximum share of 50 percent of
the fish was granted to the Indians. Washington's additional
argument, that the district court had ordered a state agency to
take an action unauthorized to it by state law, and that the
district court had thereafter unlawfully seized authority over the
state fisheries, was defused by the Supreme Court in a short
discussion of the meaning of the supremacy clause. 6
JURISDICTION: Indian Country Concept Extended to Indian
Schools
"Indian country" has been recently redefined by the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals in the case of C.M.G. v. Oklahoma,
594 P.2d 798 (Okla. Cr. 1979). Article 1, Section 3 of the
Oklahoma constitution prohibits state jurisdiction over Indian
country, but cause for interpretation of the term arose when an
Indian student at Chilocco Indian School was tried in a criminal
action in a state court. The act occurred at the Chilocco school,
which raised the conceptual disagreement as to what is "Indian
country," and whether the school can be considered sufficiently a
"dependent Indian community" as to be included in the definition of Indian country.
The court found the overwhelming majority of the occupants
and residents of the school grounds to be Indians, and that the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
175 U.S. I (1899).
198 U.S. 371 (1905).
433 U.S. 165 (1977).
99 S.Ct. 3055, 3079 (1979).
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whole of the funding and services had been provided by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The court also found that the land was
neither an allotment nor a diminished reservation, and the
Cherokee Nation had no legal interest in the land. However,
when the Cherokee Outlet land was ceded to the United States,
part of it was set aside and reserved for the settlement of those
Indians to be educated at the Chilocco school and for use by the
school itself. The state, arguing from United States v. Myers,'
proposed that an Indian school cannot be Indian country, also
that since no one tribe has an interest in the school, there cannot
be Indian country. The court distinguished Myers in that the land
in that case had not been set aside for Indian use but for
Oklahoma state schools. The court also struck down the state's
second argument with the statement that Indian country need not
inure to the benefit of a single named tribe, nor need the title remain in the Indians who are to benefit from its use. Citing United
States v. Pelican,' the court held the land to be Indian country,
and therefore subject only to tribal or federal jurisdiction, "simply
because it had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as
such." 3 Chilocco is therefore a dependent Indian community and
Oklahoma has no jurisdiction over it.

JURISDICTION:
Acquisition

Public Law 280 Authority and Its

The relationship between the states and Indian tribes subject to
Public Law 2801 was recently reexamined in the case of
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima
Nation, 99 S.Ct. 740 (1979). The focal concern was a Washington
state statute2 which gave the state civil and criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians and Indian territory within the state. This grant
of authority was to be conditioned only upon the provision that
in all but eight subject-matter areas such jurisdiction could not be
obtained without the consent of the tribes, and that only trust
and restricted lands required such special consent. The authority
over all other land was extended automatically.

1.
2.
3.
1.

206 F. 387 (8th Cir. 1913).
232 U.S. 442 (1914).
594 P.2d 802 (1979).
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90.
2. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 37.12.010.
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The Yakima Nation contended that the statute as applied was
in total noncompliance with the procedural aspects of Public Law
280 both because of the disclaimer of jurisdiction over
Indian lands in the Washington constitution and because of the
statute's promulgation of partial, or "checkerboard," authority.
The tribe then urged that the state of Washington be required to
amend its constitution so as to eliminate the disclaimer, and also
that the statute as a whole be declared unconstitutional as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. The Ninth Circuit had agreed, declaring
the manner of jurisdiction to be "irrational," and the statute as a
whole to be so nonseverable as to be wholly unconstitutional. 3
In the Supreme Court, the state argued that since the
Washington Supreme Court had declared legislative action to be
the voice of popular consent in the removal through fait accompli
of the disclaimer, then the requirement of popular amendment of
their constitution found in Section 6 of Public Law 280 had been
satisfied.
The Supreme Court agreed with the state of Washington, finding the wording of Section 6 too speculative to mandate a
popular referendum on the subject." The Court also rejected the
other Yakima arguments, first denying that the statute's
classifications are racial and therefore "suspect" and insupportable, absent a compelling state interest, by referring to the
"unique legal status of Indian tribes" and the necessity it produces for racial classification in federal legislation. The Court
admitted the limitations placed upon state legislation of this sort
but distinguished the Washington statute as being a conduit for
federal law explicitly covering the situation.' In addition, the
Supreme Court disposed of the tribe's contention that the statute
was an abridgement of a fundamental right to self-government by
pointing out that Congress may at any time restrict the powers of
the Indian tribes, that it had done so in Public Law 280, and the
state was only responding statutorily to a federal directive
authorizing it to exercise federal power. 6 Nor, said the Court, was
there any violation of the equal protection clause, because the
plan for the assumption of jurisdiction was "not so haphazard as
not to logically carry out its objective." Leaving no room for
3. 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. 99 S.Ct. 752 (1979).
5. Ad. at 761.
6. Id.
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doubt, the Court spoke thus: "In short, checkerboard jurisdiction is not novel in Indian law, and does not, as such, violate the
Constitution." 7
JURISDICTION: Regulation of Hunting and Fishing on Public
Law 280 Land
The Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion to deliberate Minnesota's Public Law 280 jurisdiction with respect to control of
hunting and fishing within the White Earth Reservation. Thirteen
individual defendants were prosecuted under state fish and game
laws for their activities within the reservation boundaries. The appeals culminated in the case of Minnesota v. Clark, CA No. 189
(Minn., Becker County, August 3, 1979). The defendants, all
Chippewa Indians, had been arrested on land not owned by or
for the tribe or any individual, but which was within the confines
of the White Earth Reservation.
State jurisdiction over all Indian country save the Red Lake
Reservation had been granted to Minnesota by the terms of
Public Law 280.' However, by the same statute, "nothing ...
shall

. . .

deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band or com-

munity of any right, privilege or immunity afforded under
Federal treaty agreement or statute with respect to hunting, trapping or fishing or the control, licensing or regulation thereof." 2
The state claimed Public Law 280 to be inapplicable because the
White Earth territory was not "Indian country." Even if it were,
the state argued, the rights in question had not been established
by treaty. The Indian country status was disputed on the basis of
the state's claim that the Nelson Allotment Act of 1889
disestablished the reservation,3 and therefore the 18 U.S.C.A. §
1151(a) definition of "Indian country" did not apply.
The court noted that the terms of the Nelson Act merely provided for optional allotments and opened up part of the White
Earth Reservation to white settlement, and that this was insufficient to terminate its reservation status.4 Specific congressional
intent to that effect must be found before disestablishment may
7. Id. at 762.
1. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, cl. 505, 67 Stat. 588 amending ch. 53
of 18 U.S.C.A. to add § 1162 and 28 U.S.C.A. to add § 1360.
2. Id.
3. 25 Stat. 642 (1889).
4. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol.7

be shown.' Since the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously
found such intent to be lacking in the Nelson Act,6 it rejected
that argument. The court founded its construction upon the doctrine that, "[T]reaties and statutes are 'not a grant of rights to
the ]Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of
those not granted.' "I The court's prior ruling (Forge)had held
the Leech Lake Reservation as still established under a similar
argument. The Nelson Act had provided that some Chippewas
would move from the Leech Lake Reservation to the White Earth
Reservation. Thus, the court reasoned, if the Nelson Act had not
terminated the first reservation, it could not have terminated the
second. The White Earth Reservation not being disestablished,
then all land within it was Indian country. The court then further
distinguished its result from that in DeCoteau8 by stating that the
Indians here had never understood that the reservation would remain anything but intact, contrary to the situation in DeCoteau.
Application of the doctrine of resolving doubtful treaty expressions in favor of the Indians would then square the court's decision with federal law. 9
The same rationale for resolving treaty expressions was
applied by the court to the state's second argument. The court
found that all aboriginal rights had been at one time extinguished
by treaty, but that the same had been subsequently reactivated,
also by treaty, and continued in force. This reactivation was
found by the court in the grant of the reservation. Applying the
aforementioned doctrine, the court reasoned that the Indians
could not have been granted the land without concurrently receiving the appurtenant game rights as a basic incident of reservation
status. II
SELF-DETERMINATION: Regulation of Hunting and Fishing
on Reservation
Currently awaiting review by the Supreme Court is the case of
North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n v. Eastern Band of
5. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County
Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Maatz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent,
368 U.S. 351 (1962).
6. State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 1977); app. dismissed, 435 U.S. 919
(1978).
7. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
8. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
9. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
10. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Kimball v. Callahan, 493
F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1975).
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Cherokee Indians, 588 F.2d. 75 (4th Cir. 1978). The Cherokee
Nation has a fish and game management enterprise which, among
other things, regulates sport fishing on the reservation by nonIndians. In a 1965 agreement between the band and the state of
North Carolina, each fisherman using Cherokee streams was required to obtain a valid North Carolina fishing license. In a
subsequent agreement (1976) the requirement was deleted. The
tribe charges a two dollar fee for sport fishing. Since 1976 the
state has also required those who would use the Cherokee waterway to purchase a state fishing license at a cost of $5.50. In addition, the state, unlike the tribe, is unwilling to issue single-day
fishing permits. The tribe has insisted that the two costs combined act as a deterrent to tourism, upon which many of them
rely for a livelihood. The Fourth Circuit determined that the
situation is proscribed by the rule in Williams v. Lee' in that the
state interference with the tribe's attempt to encourage tourism is
an obstacle to the tribe's right to self-determination. The court
enunciated the Williams tests, asking whether the state action
frustrated tribal government and impaired rights granted or
reserved by federal law, and applied them to the circumstances of
the case. Here the court found that the United States Department
of the Interior supplies the trout fished for directly to the reservation streams, in order to subsidize the tribe's tourism enterprise.
This, the court found, is done pursuant to the federal trust
obligation. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the state action did both frustrate tribal self-determination and impair rights
granted by federal law. Likewise, the Fourth Circuit found that
there was no compelling state interest in the regulation of fishing
on the reservation because the federal government stocked the
streams there regularly, with no effort to conserve the fish so supplied.
SOVEREIGNTY: Multiple Jurisdiction and the Double
Jeopardy Question
The 1978 Supreme Court decision in Oliphantcase' dominated the
attentions of Indian law scholars this past year, but unjustly overshadowed an equally important development. In a dramatic example of giving with one hand and taking with the other, the Supreme
Court handed down the companion case of United States v.
Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978). Wheeler, a Navajo tribal member,
1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
1. 98 S.Ct. 1011 (1978).
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had been convicted in the Navajo court system of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, a lesser included charge, rather than
contest the charge of statutory rape. He was meanwhile indicted by
a federal grand jury for statutory rape arising from the same incident under the authority of the Major Crimes Act.' At issue was
whether this procedure would constitute double jeopardy. The
Supreme Court began with the "well-established principle that a
federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of
the same person for the same acts and a state prosecution does not
bar a federal one," 3 and noted as basis for its reasoning the doctrine
that prosecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns will not subject a defendant to double jeopardy." The defense argument, that
Indian nations are not separate sovereigns but rather derive their
powers to punish from the sovereignty of the federal government by
congressional delegation, was refuted by the Court. Referring to
the case of Talton v. Mayes,5 the Court reasoned that Indian
sovereignty is inherent, although "limited, and subject to complete
defeasance." ' That is, Indians possess all powers not withdrawn by
treaty or statute or by "implication as a logical by-product of their
dependent status."' The Supreme Court therefore found that the
powers of criminal punishment were never relinquished by the
Navajo. Thus, they were and are a function of tribal sovereignty. In
this manner, the Supreme Court managed to affirm the principle of
tribal sovereignty in form while at the same time renouncing that
principle in substance, by refusing to affirm the existence of double
jeopardy in this case.
SOVEREIGNTY: "Smoke-Shop" Licensing
New Mexico v. United States, 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1979), concerns the right of licensing the sale of alcoholic beverages on a
reservation. The controversy lies in the wording of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1161, which repeals the prohibition against the sale of liquor to
Indians. The phraseology in question reads: "any action or transaction within Indian Country provided that it is in conformity
both with the laws of the state in which such action or transaction
occurs. . .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

."

New Mexico would read state power to license the

18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
98 S.Ct. 1011, 1082 (1978).
Id. at 1083.
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
98 S.Ct. 1011, 1086 (1978).
Id.
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sale of liquor into that sentence fragment. The Tenth Circuit has
taken the opposite view, holding that regulatory powers in
Indian country belong to Congress but for the tribe's inherent
powers. Should Congress wish to delegate its power to the states,
it could do so, but only in specific terms. From that standpoint,
the Tenth Circuit found no basis in Section 1161 for the state's
claim.' The case is currently pending review by the Supreme
Court.
TAXATION:

Back-Door Taxation of Allotted Land

In Thurston County, Nebraska v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 1212 (8th
Cir. 1978), review denied, 99 S.Ct. 2181 (1979), the county
sought to collect property taxes on Winnebago and Omaha allotment land under the auspices of the Brown-Stephens Act.' That
Act permits the county to appraise and assess for taxation Indian
land on which the original trust patent has expired and been extended. If the local tax levied remains unpaid for one year, the
county may collect the amounts from the Secretary of the Interior, who would pay out from funds in his control belonging to
the allottees. The county may not, however, levy directly against
Indian land. This case had its genesis in an attempt by the county
to tax allotment land leased to nonallottees.
Three points of contention were raised. First, did construal of
the Brown-Stephens Act require the consent of the allottees to
any tax payments made by the secretary? Second, was the
secretary empowered to make those payments? Third, can a writ
of mandamus be utilized to enforce that responsibility to pay? In
reply to the first question, the Eighth Circuit postulated that
allotted land remains free and clear from state and local taxes
while under its original trust patent. The court then held that Section 6 of the General Allotment Act2 exempts allotments from tax
until a patent-in-fee is issued.' Therefore, the tax exemption applies also to the extension of the trust period, and allottees must
consent to the taxation for it to be valid. The court found further
that a tax upon the rental of the land is tantamount to a tax upon
the land itself, so that the tax exemption applies also to the rental
value of the land. The Eighth Circuit then described the amounts
provided for in the Brown-Stephens Act as nonlienable,
1. 590 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1979).
1. Act of Dec. 30, 1916, Pub. L. No. 291, 39 Stat. 865.

2. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970).
3. Squire v. Capoeman, 375 U.S. 1 (1956).
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nonobligatory tax assessments that the Secretary of the Interior
has a mandatory duty to pay upon the allottee's consent. Mandamus, however, may not be employed because the Act has no provisions for a cause of action on delinquent tax; thus, a writ of
mandamus would only enable the county to do indirectly what it
could not achieve directly.
TAXATION: Natural Resources on Tribal Land-Who May
Tax Severance?
Crow Tribe v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1979), concerns the validity of state taxation of coal from Indian reservations. Montana statute [Montana Revised Codes Annotated §§
84-1312 to 84-1325 (1947)] imposes a severance tax upon coal produced by non-Indian mine lessees from Indian land and ceded
areas. The Crow Tribe has its own 25 percent severance tax upon
coal taken from its reservation and has complained that the double taxation makes mining on the Crow reservation unprofitable.
The tribe contended in district court that Article I, Section 8,
clause 3 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the exclusive right to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and
that without express authority, the state may not regulate trust
lands. The court noted, in disagreement, that there is no case law
exempting taxes on income by a non-Indian lessee of Indian land,
and that, additionally, the tax was not on the land itself but on a
product thereof and on the mine operators, and these concepts
are dissimilar. The court held the severance of the coal to be the
distinguishing tax factor, and ruled further that the tribe's
Williams v. Lee "burden on tribal government" argument, to be
so remote from the facts as to be inapposite.
The tribe's final theory of tribal tax preemption was likewise
rejected by the court on the basis of FortMojave Tribe v. County
of San Bernardino,2 which posits that a nonlessee cannot be
preempted. The court used Fort Mojave to settle the case by this
method: "The essence of Fort Mojave is that the concept of Indian sovereignty is no longer the proper major focus of analysis
in taxing situations. Rather, the inquiry is one involving [the]
analysis of the applicable Federal statutes to determine whether
state action has been preempted." 3 If there has been no preemption, the state statute need only satisfy the Williams v. Lee
1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976).
3. 469 F. Supp. 154, 163 (1979).
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test-it must allow the tribe to make its own laws and be governed by them. In this case, therefore, the district court found no
need for tribal or federal preemption.
TAXATION:

Oil and Gas Leases to Non-Indian Lessees

Clark v. United States, 587 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1978), offered the
Tenth Circuit an opportunity to scrutinize the tax nature of products of tax-exempt Indian land. The land in question was a taxexempt allotment subject to an oil and gas lease to a non-Indian.
The owner received cash bonus and delay rental payments and
sought their tax status. The main inquiry for the court was
whether these payments were in actuality taxable advance
royalties. The court recognized the distinction that Indians are no
different from others in their tax responsibilities as to minerals
produced, but that they do enjoy a special status as to income
from the land itself. The court then examined the applicable
statute' and reconciled the holding in Choate v. Trapp2 with it. In
"resolv[ing] doubtful meanings in the Indians' favor," the court
concluded that the statute was designed to tax only income
derivedfrom actual production. Therefore, while royalties were
deemedtaxable, cash bonuses and delay rental payments were held
to be otherwise.
TAXATION:
Income

Property Tax Exemption Not Extended to

A distinction between income tax and property tax was the concern of the United States Court of Claims in Critzer v. United
States, No. 134-75 (Ct. Cl., April 18, 1979). The plaintiff
operated businesses and derived income from leases on buildings
located on tax-exempt reservation land. She sought a determination of the taxable nature of that income. The land was owned by
the United States pursuant to the Act of June 4, 1924, 43 Stat.
376, 25 U.S.C. § 331 and held by the plaintiff as per the Indian
Reorganization Act.' Plaintiff argued that her interest was taxexempt under Section 21 of the 1924 act because the income was
derived solely and directly from the land, and that if the land was
exempt from taxation, the improvements were also. The court
differed in its interpretation of the statute, holding that the
primary source of tax-exempt revenue must be the land itself and
1. Act of May 10, 1928, ch. 517, § 3, 45 Stat. 495.
2. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
1. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 461.
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not, as here, the improvements and sundry personal services
rendered in connection therewith. These the court held to be
capital assets, the utilization and management of which produces
taxable income. The court found the example of nontaxable income from the sale of timber in Squire v. Capoeman' to be inapplicable here for that reason. Moreover, the court also held a
plaintiff's Rickert theory3 to be inapplicable, in that tax exemptions on land only carry over to improvements thereon in the case
of property tax, whereas the immediate case dealt with income
tax. Citing Mescalero Apache. Tribe v. Jones,' the court noted
that there the Supreme Court upheld a gross receipts tax, similar
to an income tax, but invalidated a compensating use tax, which
would correspond to a property tax. The lesson the Court of
Claims drew from this precedent is that a property tax exemption
will not extend to the area of income tax on the federal level.
TRI3AL MEMBERSHIP:
Tribal Benefits?

Who Determines Eligibility For

The Supreme Court has reinforced the "Indian-as-Legal-Status"
concept in Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States (Adams v. Morton), 581 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1978), review denied, 99 S. Ct. 1498
(1979), a dispute involving $2.1 million in land claim settlements,
and its dispersal. Congress in its appropriation had used specific
language to designate the recipients of the settlement with the
Gros Ventre. In 25 U.S.C. § 1262 the money was tendered to
"those whose names appear on the February 5, 1937, payment
roll of the Gros Ventre tribe of the Fort Belknap reservation, or
(b) who are descended from a person whose name appears on
said roll, if such member possesses a greater degree of Gros Ventre blood than Assiniboine blood." The tribe asserted that much
of the money was going to people who did not meet the Gros
Ventre one-quarter blood quantum criterion for eligibility for
triba[ membership. Therefore, according to the tribe, the
distribution was invalid. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, as did the
Supreme Court in its denial of review. The courts found no
statutory language limiting the distribution of the fund to
members of the Gros Ventre Tribe. The tribe, said the Ninth Circuit, may regulate membership, but in this case Congress has
specified the beneficiaries. In doing so, Congress has also decided,
in a limited capacity, who is a Gros Ventre.
2. 351 U.S. I (1956).
3. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 442 (1903).
4. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
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